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The international oil market has been very volatile over the past
threedecades. In industrialized economies, especially in Europe, taxes
represent a large fraction of oil prices and governments do not seem
to react to oil price shocks by using oil taxes strategically. Theaim of
this paper is to analyze optimal oil taxation in a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model of a small open economy that imports oil.
We obtain that in general it is not optimal to distort the oil price
paid by …rms with taxes. Extending the model in several ways this
result could be reversed depending on environmental considerations
and available …scal instruments.
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Theinternational oil market has beenvery volatileoverthepastthree decades.
In 1999 and 2000 signi…cant increases in oil prices have been observed, due to
restrictions in oil supply by OPEC, prompting economic agents to advocate
government policies to mitigate the e¤ects of oil price increases by cutting
taxes. Figure 1 represents the evolution of gasoline prices with and without
taxes [see International Energy Agency (2000)]. We observe that both series
follow similar paths; so we can conclude that governments do not seem to
react to oil price shocks by using oil taxes strategically. Given that taxes
represent a large fraction of oil prices in industrialized economies (especially
in Europe), governments have signi…cant scope to use taxes to accommodate
oil price shocks.





























































































































































































The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of oil taxes in small
economies that import oil and take as given the international oil price, for
example as in Spain. A fundamental question in this framework is, How
should oil taxes be set over the long run and over the business cycle? To
address this question we combine two di¤erent strands of the literature:
the macroeconomic incidence of oil price shocks on one hand and optimal
taxation on the other hand.
1The e¤ects of energy price shocks on economic activity have long been
recognized in the literature. Finn (1991) and Kim and Loungani (1992)
focus on the analysis of energy price shocks, …nding that this kind of shocks
can contribute to economic ‡uctuations. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)
argue that modifying the standard neoclassical growth model by assuming
imperfect competition makes it easier to explain the size of the declines in
output and real wages that follow increases in the price of oil. Atkeson
and Kehoe (1999) explore implications of considering alternative models of
energy use, …nding di¤erent implications for how capital and output respond
to permanent di¤erences in energy prices.
The literature on optimal taxation suggests that the government should
raise revenue by using the tax instruments with the lowest e¢ciency cost
[Diamond and McFadden (1974)]. Many authors, such as Bizer and Stuart
(1987) and Goulder (1994) point out that energy taxes have high e¢ciency
cost, which becomes even larger under the imperfect competition assumption
[Rotemberg and Woodford (1994)]. If environmental damage is taken into
account, the e¢ciency cost of energy taxes decreases by reducing pollution
[Goulder (1994)].
The framework used in this paper is a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model of a small open economy that imports oil. The economy consists
of consumers and …rms that behave competitively and a government that
…nances an exogenous ‡ow of public spending by using consumption and oil
taxes. The government chooses taxes optimally by maximizing welfare and
taking as given the behavior of private agents.
We establish that, in general, the government should not distort the oil
price paid by …rms with taxes, even when consumption of oil is considered
and the government distinguishes between the taxes paid by the households
and the …rms. These results also hold over the business cycle: in general,
in a small open economy it is not optimal to use oil taxes paid by …rms to
accommodate shocks. In such cases, consumption and household oil taxes
would be the optimal …scal instruments that the government uses in response
to shocks. This result could change depending on environmental issues and
available tax instruments.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we present the
baseline model of a small open economy that imports oil. In the third section
we extend the model assuming that imported oil is also used by households
as a consumption good. Finally, in the fourth section we summarize the
conclusions.
22 A simple oil dependent small open econ-
omy
Consider a small open economy that needs to import oil to produce. We
assume that this economy is small in the sense that its actions do not a¤ect
the rest of the world. In particular, the price of oil is taken as given. There
are two sources of ‡uctuations in this economy: technology shocks and oil
price shocks.
The economy is populated by a large number of identical in…nite-lived
households and …rms. A constant return to scale technology is available to
transform labor (nt), capital (kt) and oil (et) into output (yt):
yt = F(nt;kt;et;zt); (1)
where zt represents an exogenous stochastic productivity shock.
Output can beused for consumption (ct), newcapital (kt+1), oil purchases
(ptet), government spending (gt) and non-oil net exports (tbt):
ct + kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±)kt + gt +ptet + tbt = yt; (2)
where ± is the depreciation rate of capital and pt is the exogenous oil price
that follows a given stochastic process. Agents in this economy can buy and
sell foreign bonds (bt) in the international capital market at the international
real rate of return (r¤
t):
tbt = bt+1 ¡ (1 +r
¤
t)bt: (3)
The consumer’s problem is to maximize the expected lifetime utility sub-








t)ct +kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡±)kt + bt+1 = wtnt + rtkt + (1+ r¤
t)bt;
where ¯ is the discount factor, ¿c is a consumption tax, wt is the wage and


























t)ct + kt+1 ¡(1¡ ±)kt +bt+1 = wtnt +rtkt +(1 +r
¤
t)bt: (7)
The representative …rm solves:




t is an oil tax. Marginal productivities equalize input prices:
wt = Fnt; (8)
(1+ ¿
e
t)pt = Fet; (9)
rt = Fkt: (10)
The government …nances an exogenous ‡ow of government spending (gt)






A competitive equilibrium is a set of paths of allocations fct; nt; kt+1; et;
bt+1g, prices fwt;pt;rt;r¤
tg and policies f¿c
t;¿e
t;gtg that satisfy the following:
(i) the allocations fct;nt;kt+1;bt+1g solve consumer problem givenfwt;rt;r¤
tg
and ¿c
t, (ii) the allocations fnt;kt;etg solvethe …rm problem givenfwt;rt;ptg,
zt and ¿e
t, (iii) the government budget constraint holds at each period, (iv)
the goods, labor, capital, bonds and oil markets clear.
In the competitive equilibrium the government policies are arbitrary. We
nowconsider a government that chooses its …scal instruments optimally, tak-
ing as given the behavior of the private agents. The government problem
4can be divided in such a way that the optimal allocations can be obtained
















0)b0 + (1¡ ± + r0)k0]
ct+kt+1¡(1¡±)kt+gt+ptet+bt+1¡(1+r¤
t)bt = F(nt;kt;et;zt):
The …rst restriction is the implementability constraint, that is the in…nite
horizon household budget constraint where consumer and …rm …rst-order
conditions have been used to substitute out prices and policies.
The implementability constraint is included in the objective function in









0)b0+ (1 ¡± +r0)k0]; (12)
where W(ct;nt;¸) = U(ct;nt) + ¸[Uctct + Untnt], with ¸ representing the
Lagrange multiplier that discounts the implementability constraint. Optimal




Giventhe optimal allocations, we can obtain the taxes that support these
allocations as a competitive equilibrium outcome by using the optimal rules





Fnt = 0; (13)
and the oil tax is pinned down from (9).
Because of the time inconsistency problem, we assume that the govern-
ment can commit itself to follow the optimal …scal policy plan.
The objective function is an increasing function of ¿c
0. Therefore the
government has incentives to set the initial consumption tax as high as pos-
sible. The reason is that ¿c
0 changes the marginal value of the initial stocks
of capital and bonds for the household by rising the e¤ective price of the
5consumption good, and the individual cannot react to the tax by changing
the capital or bond stocks.
Proposition 1 At the optimum the government should not distort the oil
price paid by the …rm with taxes f¿e
t = 0g1
t=0.
Proof. Given that the government objective function is di¤erent at t = 0
from t > 0, the proof must be divided in two stages:
1) t > 0.
Solving the government problem, we obtain the following …rst-order con-
dition for et:
¡Wct(pt ¡ Fet) = 0:
Under standard assumptions, interiority can be assured, so Wct 6= 0,
and:
pt ¡ Fet = 0: (14)
Since optimal allocations must satisfy the competitive equilibrium condi-
tions, (9) and (14) must hold simultaneously. Consequently ¿e
t = 0; for all
t > 0:
2) t = 0.














0)b0 +(1¡ ± + r0)k0]
¶











0)b0 + (1¡ ± + r0)k0]
:
As we have discussed above, the government has incentives to set an
initial consumption tax as high as possible, and:
lim
¿ c
0!1(p0 ¡Fe0) = 0: (15)
6Then, as in the …rst stage, it follows that ¿e
0 = 0:
The result presented above implies that the government should not tax
oil purchases not only not in the long run, but also not in the short run,
because is not optimal to use oil taxes in response to shocks1. Therefore,
proposition1 does not supportthe claims of private agents inmany European
countries that advocate for cuts in oil taxes to accommodate changes in the
international oil prices.
Proposition 1 is equivalent to the result on intermediate good taxation
of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) insofar as oil can be reinterpreted as an
intermediate good in this economy. This result implies that the tax on in-
termediate goods should be zero since an optimal tax system must maintain
aggregate production e¢ciency.
Proposition 2 In the presence of externalities, the optimal oil tax could be
di¤erent from 0.
Proof. We assume that the use of oil reduces welfare. We therefore
introduce oil as a negative externality into the utility function:
U(ct;nt;et); with Uet < 0: (16)
Proceeding as above, we obtain an objective function that depends also on
oil: W(ct;nt;et;¸): Solving the government problem with this speci…cation
of the utility function yields the following …rst-order conditions on oil:














0)b0 +(1¡ ± + r0)k0]
¶
(p0 ¡ Fe0) = 0:
Comparing with the …rst order condition (9) it follows that ¿e
t 6= 0 for all
t ¸ 0:
1Unless an upper bound is imposed on the initial tax rate on consumption, the optimal
tax on oil would be 0 in the …rst period.
7This proposition explains the existence of optimal oil taxes when environ-
mental damage is considered. The oil tax acts as a pigouvian tax in the sense
that attempts to correct the negative externality. Optimal taxes involve a
compromise between the positive e¤ect of oil in the production function and
the negative e¤ect in the utility function, so as both e¤ects are equal at the
margin (see Baumol and Oates (1988) for a general reference).
3 Household oil consumption
We extend the model assuming that imported oil (et) is used not only by
…rms (e
f
t) as an input, but also by households (eh






We allow the government to tax e
f
t and eh




Solving the …rm problem, we set marginal productivities equal to prices:






rt = Fkt: (20)
Now the consumers also obtain satisfaction from the consumption of oil.










t)ct + kt+1¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt +(1 +¿h
t)pteh
t +bt+1 =
= wtnt +rtkt +(1 +r¤
t)bt:






























t)ct + kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±)kt + (1+ ¿h
t )pteh
t + bt+1 =
= wtnt +rtkt + (1 +r
¤
t)bt: (25)









Finally market clearing requires:














t; bt+1g, prices fwt;pt;rt;r¤




t;gtg that satisfy the
following: (i) the allocations fct;nt;eh




tg, (ii) the allocations fnt;kt;e
f
tg solve the …rm
problem given fwt;pt;rtg, zt and ¿
f
t , (iii) the government budget constraint
holds at each period, (iv) the goods, labor, capital, bonds and oil markets
clear.
The government problem is solved following the strategy described in the
previous section, that is, by dividing the problem in such a way that optimal




















0)b0 + (1¡ ± + r0)k0]








When the implementability constraint is included into the objective func-










0)b0 + (1¡ ± + r0)k0]
s:t :
ct +kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡±)kt + gt + pt(eh
t + e
f




where W(ct;nt;¸) = U(ct;nt) + ¸[Uctct +Untnt +Ueh
teh
t ]:
In next subsections we study optimal taxation for two di¤erent cases: the
case of di¤erent taxes on oil (¿h
t 6= ¿
f





3.1 Di¤erentiated oil taxes
Given optimal allocations, the taxes that support these allocations as a com-
petitive equilibrium outcome are obtained by using the optimal rules of pri-





Fnt = 0; (28)






Fnt = 0; (29)
and …nally, …rm oil tax is obtained from (19).
Proposition 3 In the optimum the government should not distort the oil




10Proof. Similar to proof in proposition 1.
Adding household oil consumption to the model does not change propo-
sition 1, and the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) result still holds. Moreover,
under the assumption that government candistinguish between oil taxes paid
by consumers and …rms, it is optimal to tax oil only as a consumption good.
Consumption and household oil taxes would be the …scal instruments that
the government uses in response to shocks.
Proposition 4 If utility isweakly separable between consumption goods fct;eh
t g
and labor fntg and is homothetic in consumption, then consumption and
















t if and only if Uct=Ueh
t = 1=pt:
Let consider the utility function U(ct;eh
t;nt) = V(Q(ct;eh
t );nt) with Q

















with e Ct = (ct;e
h
t): (32)
Di¤erentiating equation (32) with respect to ® andevaluating it at ® = 1,
we obtain (31).
Consider now the …rst-order conditions for ct andeh
t from the government
problem:
Uct + ¸[ctUctct + Uct + e
h
tUeh








t ]¡ ¹tpt = 0; (34)
where ¹t represents the Lagrangian multiplier on the aggregate resource con-
straint. Combining equations (33) and (34) we obtain:





















Under the assumptions of proposition 4, the government would tax con-
sumption and household oil at the same rate across time. This proposition
re‡ects the validity of the classic result on uniform commodity taxation of
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) in the dynamic stochastic setting we consider.
3.2 Uniform oil taxes





t). Competitive equilibrium conditions in which taxes are
involved represent an incomplete tax system [see Chari and Kehoe (1999)]


















12and the…scal instruments are (¿c
t;¿e
t). An incomplete tax system implies that
anewconditionon the allocations must hold to implement it as a competitive












Equation(39)represents thecompetitive equilibrium condition that equates
marginal rate of substitution between oil and leisure with marginal rate of
technical substitution between oil and labor, representing the compatibility
between household and …rm plans. So equation (39) must be added as a






t;nt;¸) ¡ ¸ Uc0
(1+¿ c
0)[(1+ r¤
0)b0 + (1¡ ± + r0)k0]
s:t :
















Proposition 5 In this economy with an incomplete tax system, optimal oil
tax is not zero.
Proof. Solving the government problem, we obtain the following …rst-





























where ¹t and °t are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints of the gov-
ernment problem. Comparing these conditions to the …rm oil condition (38),
we obtain ¿e
t 6= 0; for all t ¸ 0:
Proposition 6 If the tax system is completed by adding a labor tax, a zero
optimal oil tax is found.
13Proof. The inclusion of a labor tax (¿w
t ) modi…es the household budget
constraint:
(1+ ¿c
t)ct + kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±)kt + (1+ ¿h
t )pteh
t + bt+1 =
= (1¡ ¿
w
t )wtnt + rtkt + (1+ r
¤
t)bt: (40)






















which represents a complete tax system.










0)b0 + (1¡ ± + r0)k0]
s:t :
ct +kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡±)kt + gt + pt(eh
t + e
f




and the proposition can be proved similarly to proposition 1.
When the government cannot distinguish between agents that purchase
oil, optimal oil taxes depend on the tax system available. In this sense,
proposition 5 points out that in a …scal system that consists of taxes on con-
sumption and oil, the classic rule of no intermediate good taxation is broken
and the optimal oil tax is not zero. To maintain Diamond and Mirrlees’
(1971) result, a new …scal instrument is required. In this framework a labor
tax would complete the tax system.
144 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze optimal taxation in oil dependent economies. Using
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that includes oil as an input,
we study how oil taxes should be in both the long and the short run. The
standard literature points out that energy taxes have greater e¢ciency costs
than other kinds of taxes. In a general framework, this result holds, and the
government should not distort with taxes the oil price paid by the …rm over
the long run or over the business cycle. When environmental damages are
considered, this result is reversed and a non-zero oil tax is optimal.
Extending the model by including oil consumption by households, two
di¤erent situations arise. When the government can distinguish between oil
taxes paid by the household and the …rm, it is optimal to tax the two dif-
ferent uses of oil at di¤erent rates. Thus, whereas the zero taxation result
holds for oil used by …rms, the government sets household oil taxes jointly
with consumption taxes to raise revenue and to accommodate shocks. More-
over, under suitable assumptions on preferences, the government would tax
consumption and household oil at the same rate across time. When it is not
possible to tax oil at di¤erent rates, an incomplete tax system problem arises,
and it is optimal to distort the oil price paid by the …rm. Otherwise a new
tax instrument is required and oil should not be taxed.
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